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Abstract
In the struggle between the forces of free trade and the restrictive influence of insu-
larism the latter recently seems to have the upper hand. This is illustrated by the
referendum of June 23, 2016 where the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the
European Union (EU). In this paper we evaluate the consequences of this event for
EU integration. In particular, we analyze how the extent of EU economic integration
would change once the UK leaves the Union. To that end we develop an integra-
tion benchmark that consists of the steady state production equilibrium characterized
by arbitrage pricing and perfect factor mobility. We apply metrics to measure the
distance between this benchmark and the data. We find that the integration in the
EU is incomplete and its trend is non-linear while Brexit would not bring negative
consequences to its development.
Keywords Brexit · Regional integration · Euclidean distance · Factor mobility ·
Arbitrage pricing · Reflected geometric Brownian motion
JEL Classiﬁcation E13 · F15 · F21 · F4 · O11 · O52
1 Introduction
Since the mid-1980s there has been a surge of regional trade agreements (RTAs)
around the globe as subsets of countries seek deeper integration among themselves.
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Lately, the announced RTA between Mongolia and Japan in June 2016 represents
an important milestone in the history of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
that all its members now have an RTA in force (see the WTO website). June 2016
also marks another rare event, namely Brexit, the UK departure from the European
Union (EU) voted during the historic referendum of June 23, 2016. One of the prime
motivations for Brexit is UK’s desire to re-establish sovereignty of its own borders
(and territorial waters). It wishes to form regional trading agreements with countries
of their choice, namely the USA. More importantly, advocates of Brexit are against
the free movement of people and wish to retain control of immigration. As these are
key pillars of EU integration, other EU members are not inclined to accept any British
proposal to keep access to the European single market.
Though the future design of economic relations between the UK and EU can take
different forms, three options are frequently cited: the Norwegian scenario, the Swiss
scenario and Hard Brexit. Both Norway and Switzerland have in common that they
are part of Schengen but are not customs union members. Switzerland differs in that
its agreement exempts the financial sector. However, both countries gained access to
the internal market by allowing for the free labor mobility with the EU. As the latter
aspect is not acceptable to the UK, the third option, Hard Brexit, seems a realistic
option. UK would then leave EU-28 but be released from any obligation to allow for
the free mobility of labor with the EU. Bilateral trade would operate according to
the WTO rules, e.g. with no special agreement on tariffs and non-tariff barriers. This
outcome is favoured by “Hard Brexiteers” since any future RTA would be negotiated
freely with no EU interference. Summing up:
”We cannot leave the club and continue to use its facilities”
(Lord Mandelson, The Guardian; June 10, 2016).
A number of studies have looked into the implications of the UK leaving the European
Union. For example, Ebell et al. (2016) analyse the costs and benefits for the UK if it
no longer participates to a free trade agreement for goods and services with the EU.
Ebell and Warren (2016) evaluate the scenario where the UK obtains the same status
as Norway and Switzerland. Both scenarios lead to a reduction in projected GDP
for the UK compared to the status quo. Differently, Dhingra et al. (2018) analyse
the multilateral trade effects of the various options and in all cases obtain negative
welfare losses. While most studies mainly evaluate the long-term implications of
different trade patterns for the UK, a focus of this paper is to analyse the re-allocation
of productive resources for remaining EU members following Hard Brexit in terms of
arbitrage pricing and factor mobility. Specifically, the question is: What would be the
extent of integration for the remaining EU countries once the UK leaves the Union?
Results of the 2016 referendum cannot be seen independently of the public’s dis-
content with the European Union. The latter is currently being criticized by scholars,
politicians, and the popular press who demand reforms.1 The claim is that member
countries bear the financial costs of very costly bureaucracies that in many cases fail
to benefit European citizens because of, for example, a lack of common approaches
1A recent survey identifies turbulent shifts in general attitudes toward Brussels-based institutions. For
example, the European public is twice as likely to have a negative view of EU than European elites (see
webpage of the PEW Research Center, accessed July 2017).
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to tax evasion, cheap labor migration and harmonization of corporate income tax.
This demand for value from the EU is triggered by numerous factors like shaky
economic conditions, migration from Eastern member countries, the waves of war
refugees but also a lack of transparency. This is happening worldwide but is more
pronounced in some Western countries where populism is on the rise (e.g., France,
the Netherlands, Hungary and Poland). Given this background, the following ques-
tions are often raised: (i) What are the objective grounds for challenging the model
proposed by EU over time? (ii) Is the conjecture correct that the EU shows symp-
toms of reduced economic integration over time? Therefore, the answer to how the
sequence of enlargements experienced since the 1957 Treaty of Rome affects the
time pattern of EU integration assumes importance. While we are aware of previ-
ous research on the comparison between the USA, European Union and Eurozone
for a few years (e.g. Rogers 2007), we have not seen any empirical estimation in the
literature of such a time profile of European integration over several decades.
Through a RTA, a group of countries agrees to enjoy freer international economic
relations among themselves. In the extreme, this allows for the free movement of
goods and services, capital, and labour within the integrated area. However, the insti-
tutional arrangements under which countries open their borders will differ in reality.
As a result, the global economy looks complex beyond comprehension, with a web of
treaties and rules whose reallocation of global production is poorly understood. Taken
together these observations point to the need to construct a single measure of regional
integration that goes beyond trade statistics but includes goods and factor flows. The
idea is to build a simple model that generates testable predictions about EU inte-
gration and performs the Brexit counterfactual analysis. Specifically, we develop an
integration benchmark that consists of a steady state equilibrium characterized by
both free trade and perfect mobility of physical and human capital. A metric is then
developed to measure the distance between this benchmark and the observed equilib-
rium characterized by the data, namely with barriers to trade and to factor mobility.
This metric allows for comparison of integration over time and across regions. In
addition, it is used to analyse the effects of Brexit on EU integration (excl. UK).
Another important application measures economic integration in the EU-28 and
compares the outcomes with two control groups namely, the European Monetary
Union (EMU or Eurozone) and Latin America (specifically the Latin American Inte-
gration Association or ALADI). WTO provides details regarding the institutional
arrangements of these RTAs. ALADI is defined as a free trade area, EU-28 a com-
mon market and EMU a monetary union, in order of increasing economic integration
according to the WTO criteria (e.g., Table C.1 of WTO 2011). ALADI is a form
of ‘shallow’ integration as it mainly refers to border measures whereas EU-28 and,
even more so, the Eurozone are characterized by ‘deep’ integration since agree-
ments go well beyond the removal of border measures and include, for example, the
coordination of policies.
Our analysis focuses on the distribution of output and the stocks of productive
factors within a particular region. Particularly, the variables of interest are country
output shares of regional output and country factor shares of regional factor supplies
that have been shown to be important both theoretically and empirically (see, for
example, Helpman and Krugman 1985; Bowen et al. 1987; Viaene and Zilcha 2002).
I. Mikolajun, J.-M. Viaene
In this paper, shares behave randomly and their path is assumed to be described by
(possibly correlated) reflected geometric Brownian motions with a lower and upper
bound. A random process modelled as a Brownian motion is a framework that is
popular in the empirical trade and economic geography literature because it has the
property of being parsimonious in terms of number of parameters (e.g. Albornoz
et al. 2016). A lower bound is justified since nowadays countries are unlikely to
disappear; an upper bound matters as the sum of shares must be one. Given this,
starting from some initial conditions, we derive the steady state distribution of shares
across member countries of a particular region.
Assuming fully integrated goods and factor markets and comparing dynamic
paths, we obtain the following results: (i) Using variable elasticity production func-
tion, we develop and empirically support the equality between output and factor
shares of economies that are member of an integrated area; (ii) Using metrics of
distance, we construct an integration measure that includes both goods and factor
flows and show that EU integration is still incomplete; (iii) Besides, the estimated
time profile of EU integration is non-linear, exhibiting a w-pattern. Except for 1957,
none of the enlargement dates are endogenously selected as being breakpoints; (iv)
While UK’s membership (together with Ireland and Denmark) has initiated a quar-
ter century of EU integration growth, we find that its departure would enhance EU
integration (excl. UK).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3
outlines the model and establishes key theoretical results; in addition, it describes the
data and discusses the empirical method used. Section 4 derives the steady state equi-
librium distribution of shares and applies Maximum Likelihood on available data.
Section 5 includes the derivation of the steady state distribution of shares and the
computation of integration measures for each region. Section 6 explores the quantita-
tive implications of our results by computing the effects of Brexit on EU integration
(excl. Britain). Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains all the proofs, describes
the data sources and methods and outlines our bootstrap replications.
2 Related Literature
The literature has demonstrated the benefits of international trade for the growth
experience of open economies (Harrison and Rodrı´guez-Clare 2009). Particularly,
integration among economies plays an important role in that it increases the long-run
rate of growth. For example, the essential idea of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) is
that integration stimulates the worldwide exploitation of increasing returns to scale
in research and development. Factor mobility is also a powerful instrument in the
allocation of resources and some regions of the world have fewer barriers to labour
mobility than to goods trade. The complex nature of the relationship between trade
and factor mobility is found in two classic papers in the literature, namely Mundell
(1957) and Markusen (1983). Mundell (1957) shows that if factors are internationally
mobile, in the extreme form, trade in goods will cease, which implies that goods trade
and factor flows are substitutes. Markusen (1983) challenged the idea of substitution
between trade and factor movements. Assuming similar endowments, he relaxes a
Is Hard Brexit Detrimental to EU Integration? Theory and Evidence
number of assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, one by one, and concludes
that eliminating barriers to factor movement results in the complementarity between
trade and the movements of both labour and physical capital. Felbermayr et al. (2015)
reviews the literature and derives new conditions for substitutability and complemen-
tarity in numerous settings. A major conclusion is that the way international factors
directly influence the allocation of resources is an empirical question.
A vast literature has also contributed to our understanding of the various dimen-
sions of international labour migration. For example, recent topics include interest
groups and immigration (Facchini et al. 2011), policy interactions between host and
source countries facing skilled-worker migration (Djajic´ et al. 2012) and temporary
low-skilled migration and welfare (Djajic´ 2014). Closer to our work Borjas (2001)
tests the hypothesis of immigration being ”the grease on the wheels” of the labour
market. Likewise, in our model migration leads to greater labour market efficiency
in that the geographic sorting of migrants ensures that the value marginal products
of labour are equalized across countries. Labour migration can also alter the mar-
ket for physical capital and aggregate production. Galor and Stark (1990) show that
the probability of return migration results in migrants saving more than compara-
ble local residents. Kugler and Rapoport (2007), Javorcik et al. (2011) find that the
presence of migrants in the US causes US foreign direct investment in the migrants’
countries of origin. In contrast, calibrating a dynamic general equilibrium model to
match Canadian data over 1861 - 1913 Wilson (2003) shows that labour force growth
through immigration is responsible for up to three quarters of the rise in the foreign
capital inflows. Similarly, the driving force behind international capital flows in our
framework is the impact of international labour migration on the value of marginal
products of physical capital.
Integration over time can also be assessed in other ways. For example, Riezman
et al. (2011) assess how far the world economy is between autarky and free trade
and develop methodologies to answer the question using a global general equilib-
rium model. Riezman et al. (2013) discuss metrics of globalization for individual
economies as distance measures between fully integrated and trade restricted equilib-
ria. Bowen et al. (2011) test empirically the properties of the distribution of outputs
and stocks of productive factors expected to arise between members of a fully inte-
grated economic area. Other studies focus on prices of homogeneous goods and
homogeneous assets assuming that price differentials reflect market frictions and/or
lack of arbitrage. For example, Volosovych (2011) looks at patterns of nominal and
real long-term bonds; Uebele (2013) analyses wheat prices in Europe and the USA;
Hoeberichts and Stokman (2018) provide evidence of increased price dispersion
since 2010 within the Eurozone. Though these studies do not fully control for suc-
cessive EU enlargements, they provide important signals regarding the allocation of
productive resources across regions and countries.
3 Equality of Output and Factor Shares
Given this background the analysis of this section focuses on how the distribution
of output and stocks of productive factors would look like if an economic area were
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characterized by fully integrated goods and factor markets. Particularly, we show the
importance of each member’s share of an area’s total output and its share of the area’s
total stock of physical capital and of human capital, concepts which have been shown
to be important both theoretically and empirically.
3.1 The Economic Framework
We consider an economic area consisting of N countries. As our model considers
two types of international factor flows, we take the aggregate production function of
any country n, Ynt , to depend on both sorts of capital: Ynt = Fn(Knt ,Hnt ) where
Knt stands for the stock of physical capital and Hnt for the stock of human capital,
n = 1, ..., N is a country, t = 1, ..., T is a time index. Production is carried out by
competitive firms which combine these two production factors to produce a single
commodity. The aggregate level of human capital at each date t has a direct effect
upon the production possibilities at that period.
Upon the integration of capital markets, physical capital will flow from the low
return to the high return country until value marginal products of physical capital
are all equal to the equilibrium rental rate r¯ of the integrated economy at any date t .
Particularly:
p1F1K = ... = pjFjK = ... = pNFNK = r¯ , (1)
where FnK is the marginal product of physical capital in country n and pn is the
price of country n goods (expressed in the same currency, e.g. euro). Likewise, upon
the integration of labor markets, human capital will flow until marginal products of
human capital are equal to w¯, the equilibrium wage rate per unit of effective labor
at date t . In particular we take this production function to be the following con-
stant returns to scale but variable elasticity of substitution (VES) production function
(Revankar 1971). The function, which is a generalized Cobb-Douglas production
function, reads:
Ynt = γK1−δρnt (Hnt + (ρ − 1)Knt )δρ , (2)
where parameter values satisfy γ > 0, 0 < δ < 1, 0 < δρ < 1. The corresponding
share of human capital in total output is δρ[1 + (ρ − 1)Knt
Hnt
]−1, decreasing in ρ and
Knt/Hnt . The elasticity of substitution υ depends linearly on the physical-to-human
capital ratio:
υ = 1 + ρ − 1
1 − δρ
Knt
Hnt
.
Our interest in production function (2) lies in a number of useful properties asso-
ciated with parameter values. With ρ = 0 the VES function degenerates to the
fixed-coefficient production function as a special case: Ynt = γKnt . This implies
redundancy of human capital in the nth economy as the employment of human capital
(and labour) is below its endowment Hnt , a common observation in many develop-
ing countries. When ρ = 1 the VES function reduces to the Cobb-Douglas function
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with a unitary elasticity of substitution (υ = 1), a popular specification in developed
economies.2
We assume υ > 0 which implies that the human-to-physical capital ratio is such
that Hnt
Knt
>
1−ρ
1−δρ . The function spelled out in Eq. 2 is therefore different from the con-
stant elasticity of substitution production function in that the elasticity of substitution
implied by the VES production function varies along the isoquant. With ρ > 1, the
latter is generally steeper as Knt/Hnt increases.
Assuming homogeneous goods and perfect arbitrage (p1 = ... = pj = ... =
pN ), free goods trade and perfect factor mobility within an economic area lead to an
equality between shares:
Proposition 1 Given the production function (2), if no barriers to the free movement
of goods, physical and human capital exist then
Ynt
∑N
k=1 Ykt
= Knt∑N
k=1 Kkt
= Hnt∑N
k=1 Hkt
. (3)
The shares of output, physical and human capital fully equalize for every country
n = 1, ..., N . Particularly, each member’s share of an area’s total output will equal
its share of the area’s total stock of physical capital and of human capital.
The proof is included in the Appendix to facilitate the reading. Relationship (3)
gives rise to a number of observations, two of which we highlight here. First, Propo-
sition 1 assumes that integrated economies like EU are similar except for their human
capital intensities. However, EU countries possess many levels of heterogeneity like
different production functions, barriers to capital mobility (e.g., corporate income
tax differentials) or to labor mobility (e.g., language, differing pension systems). It
can be shown that differences in technology or factor market imperfections lead to a
multiplicative scaling of observable variables that is different for each ratio but the
equality obtained in Eq. 3 remains the same. Second, to strengthen Proposition 1, let
us consider the other extreme model where goods are differentiated by place of origin
like in gravity models of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Anderson et al. (2015)
and others. Prices did not explicitly enter in expression (3), because, with free trade,
arbitrage eliminates any price differentials across countries and a single price will
prevail. With equal value marginal products, this price cancels in the expressions.
Now, as each of the N regions is specialized in the production of a single commodity,
it charges a different price pn with n = 1, 2, ..., N . In this setting, we obtain:
Yn
∑N
k=1 QnkYk
= Kn∑N
k=1 Kk
= Hn∑N
k=1 QnkHk
(4)
The derivation of Eq. 4 is described in Appendix A to facilitate the reading. In this
expression,  = δρ/(δρ − 1),  = 1/(δρ − 1) are composite parameters. Impor-
2The incorporation of physical capital and human capital in this form found renewed empirical sup-
port in the growth accounting literature (e.g. Mankiw et al. 1992). With human capital being the factor
complementary with physical capital, the specification also explains Lucas’ puzzle (Lucas 1990).
I. Mikolajun, J.-M. Viaene
tantly, Qnj = Snjpj/pn is the real bilateral exchange rate with Snj being the nominal
bilateral exchange rate expressed as units of n currency per unit of j currency (so
that Qnj = 1 when n = j ). Identity (4) states that with identical technologies
and perfect factor mobility, a model with differentiation by place of origin main-
tains the equal-share relationship, though it rescales variables (Yn,Hn) with real
exchange rates. Hence, with perfect factor mobility, the value marginal product of
each factor will be equal across origins but since goods are differentiated relative
prices will appear explicitly. Interestingly the type of exchange rate system plays a
role here. If Snj are equilibrium exchange rates such that absolute purchasing par-
ity holds, Qnj = Snjpj/pn = 1, expression (3) is restored. If exchange rates are
fixed or common to all countries like in the Eurozone, then relative prices will appear
explicitly.
Having established the equality of output and factor shares in integrated areas, we
now verify its empirical validity. To that end we outline the construction of our data
set and then perform empirical tests.
3.2 Data Sources andMethods
3.2.1 Deﬁning Geographic Units
Through a RTA, a group of countries agrees to enjoy freer international economic
relations among themselves. However, the institutional arrangements under which
countries open their borders will differ in reality. The following describes the three
blocks of countries in our sample.
ALADI, a Spanish acronym for the Latin American Integration Association (Aso-
ciacio´n Latinoamericana de Integracio´n) was founded in 1980 to promote trade in
the region. It is a free trade area whose member countries eliminate tariffs among
themselves but keep individual tariff schedules (and tariff revenues) on imports from
non-member countries. As members maintain their own external tariff, imports could
enter through the member country with the lowest tariff and then be re-exported
to other members. Member countries therefore agree to ’rules of origin’ that deter-
mine whether a good is eligible for a tariff-free treatment. These rules often require
that goods contain a high percentage of domestic content to prevent the simple
repackaging of goods. ALADI fits this definition. Initially it included 11 member
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). Three other countries joined the association in the
year noted: Cuba (1999), Nicaragua (2011) and Panama (2012).
The European Communities were established by the 1957 Treaties of Rome with
6 founding member states, namely Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands. Later the European Union formed to become a common market
to promote the free mobility of goods, services, persons and capital within the area.
The number of members has steadily grown to the present 28 countries. Members
eliminate tariffs among themselves but establish a common external tariff against
non-members. Customs revenues mostly accrue to a common fund that finances,
besides large institutions, social and regional projects in poor European regions.
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Table 1 reproduces the historical sequence of enlargements whose inputs are essential
for the construction of our measure of regional integration.
In a parallel manner, 19 of the 28 EU countries have the ambition to form an
economic union, where members of a common market unify all other economic (fis-
cal, monetary) and socio-economic (labor, social security) policies. While this is the
ultimate goal of the EU, only the ”Eurozone” has unified its monetary policy with
member states adopting the euro as their common currency. The Eurozone was cre-
ated in 1999 by 11 member states: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Later enlargements
include: Greece (2001), Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), Malta (2008), Slovakia
(2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015).
WTO provides detailed information regarding the institutional arrangements of
the above RTAs (see trade topics at https://www.wto.org/english). Current economic
conditions of Latin America are described by the World Bank (see economic indi-
cators at https://data.worldbank.org/indicators); those of European countries are also
portrayed in Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database).
3.2.2 Data Methods
Let us denote a share of a variable j ∈ {Y,K,H } by Sjnt . Thus, to compute output
shares SYnt we use:
SYnt = Ynt∑N
k=1 Ykt
Factor shares SKnt and SHnt are computed analogously. Hence, our sample includes
country data on outputs and stocks of physical and human capital. Our data set is an
unbalanced panel of annual data ranging from 1957 till 2016. The data for ALADI
Table 1 European Union: historical enlargements
EU name Enlargement date Additional member states
European Communities; EC-6 1957 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands
EC-9 1973 Denmark, Ireland, UK
EC-10 1981 Greece
EC-12 1986 Spain, Portugal
European Union; EU-15 1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden
EU-25 2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia
EU-27 2007 Bulgaria, Romania
EU-28 2013 Croatia
Source: Eurostat-Statistics Explained
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ends in 2014, the last year for which physical capital data is available for the countries
of this region.
We measure output as gross domestic product (GDP) expressed in international
dollars and valued at constant 2000 prices. The main source of data on output is Penn
World Tables (PWT) 7.0. We use PWT 9.0, World Bank and Eurostat as additional
data sources where information is unavailable in PWT 7.0. The data on the stock of
physical capital is obtained from the version 6.2 of PWT and extended to more recent
years using the growth rates of data from PWT 9.0 and European Commission. Just
as output, physical capital is expressed in international dollars and valued at constant
2000 prices. Human capital is measured as total population aged 15 and over that
has at least completed secondary education. The data is obtained from the version
2.1 of the Barro and Lee’s data set on educational attainment. Because the data is
only available on a five-year interval basis and because it most of the time exhibits
a clear exponential growth we use cubic splines to interpolate missing observations.
A more detailed description of the data and the methods employed for interpolation
and extrapolation is contained in the Appendix.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis we further compute the shares of output,
physical and human capital separately for the countries of the EU. Figure 1 illustrates
the distribution of all three sets of shares in 2016 where it is clear that Germany takes
the highest intra-regional share of all the variables. Likewise, sets of shares are also
computed for ALADI and EMU and are reproduced in Figs. 2 and 3 respectively.
3.3 Tests of Proposition 1
To test whether there is conformity between the ranks of the output and factor shares
we compute Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients at every time point and
compare them across regions and over time. Contrary to Pearson correlation, rank
correlation also allows for non linearities to be present in a relationship.
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Fig. 1 Distribution of output and factor shares in EU-28. Note: Year 2016. Source: Own calculations based
on Penn World Tables 7.0, 9.0 and Barro and Lee (2013)
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Fig. 2 Distribution of output and factor shares in ALADI-14. Note: Year 2014. Source: Own calculations
based on Penn World Tables 6.2, 9.0 and Barro and Lee (2013)
Table 2 reports pairwise Spearman rank correlations computed for the three
regions at different time points. Although reported correlation coefficients are pop-
ulation values and as such are not subject to sampling errors we nevertheless report
bootstrap confidence intervals in the brackets to take into account possible data mea-
surement errors. The table reveals a significant positive relationship between any pair
of shares. All the coefficients are close to or above 0.9. Thus, a country with a higher
ranked output share tends to also have higher ranked factor shares. Particularly high,
close to unity, coefficients are observed for EU and EMU indicating a nearly perfect
rank conformity. Correlations are also relatively stable over time with some but minor
over time variation, which means that a country that takes a certain rank position is
unlikely to change it quickly.
To strengthen the result on the equality of shares we also report per region the frac-
tion of countries whose shares are similar (see Table 3). For calculations we consider
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Fig. 3 Distribution of output and factor shares in EMU-19. Note: Year 2016. Source: Own calculations
based on Penn World Tables 7.0, 9.0 and Barro and Lee (2013)
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Table 2 Spearman rank
correlations Output-physical Output-human Physical capital-
capital capital human capital
ALADI
1980 0.97 [0.78, 1.00] 0.92 [0.61, 1.00] 0.89 [0.54, 1.00]
1985 0.97 [0.77, 1.00] 0.96 [0.76, 1.00] 0.93 [0.60, 1.00]
1990 0.99 [0.86, 1.00] 0.96 [0.77, 1.00] 0.94 [0.65, 1.00]
1995 0.97 [0.84, 1.00] 0.96 [0.77, 1.00] 0.92 [0.61, 1.00]
2000 0.94 [0.73, 1.00] 0.97 [0.80, 1.00] 0.90 [0.60, 0.99]
2005 0.92 [0.67, 1.00] 0.94 [0.75, 1.00] 0.87 [0.54, 0.98]
2010 0.90 [0.63, 1.00] 0.97 [0.80, 1.00] 0.88 [0.55, 0.99]
2014 0.91 [0.65, 1.00] 0.95 [0.76, 1.00] 0.88 [0.55, 0.99]
EU
1960 0.94 [0.52, 1.00] 0.94 [0.50, 1.00] 1.00 [1.00, 1.00]
1965 0.94 [0.52, 1.00] 0.94 [0.52, 1.00] 1.00 [1.00, 1.00]
1970 0.94 [0.52, 1.00] 0.89 [0.20, 1.00] 0.94 [0.52, 1.00]
1975 0.95 [0.58, 1.00] 0.95 [0.58, 1.00] 0.95 [0.70, 1.00]
1980 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 0.95 [0.59, 1.00] 0.95 [0.59, 1.00]
1985 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 0.98 [0.81, 1.00] 0.98 [0.81, 1.00]
1990 0.99 [0.89, 1.00] 0.97 [0.82, 1.00] 0.96 [0.77, 1.00]
1995 0.99 [0.92, 1.00] 0.94 [0.75, 1.00] 0.92 [0.66, 1.00]
2000 1.00 [0.95, 1.00] 0.94 [0.68, 1.00] 0.94 [0.70, 1.00]
2005 0.99 [0.96, 1.00] 0.95 [0.85, 0.98] 0.95 [0.85, 0.98]
2010 0.99 [0.97, 1.00] 0.94 [0.83, 0.98] 0.92 [0.77, 0.97]
2016 0.98 [0.91, 1.00] 0.93 [0.81, 0.98] 0.93 [0.79, 0.98]
EMU
2000 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 0.97 [0.78, 1.00] 0.97 [0.77, 1.00]
2005 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 0.97 [0.78, 1.00] 0.97 [0.78, 1.00]
2010 1.00 [1.00, 1.00] 0.97 [0.87, 1.00] 0.97 [0.87, 1.00]
2016 0.99 [0.91, 1.00] 0.96 [0.83, 1.00] 0.98 [0.91, 1.00]
Notes: (i) Although correlation
coefficients are population
values and are not subject to
sampling errors we report
bootstrap confidence intervals in
the brackets to account for
possible data measurement
errors; (ii) 5% significance
level; (iii) Number of bootstrap
replications is 10000. See also
Appendix C
pairwise Y − K , Y − H and K − H comparisons for each region and each year. For
each pairwise comparison we compute the fraction of countries whose shares differ
in absolute by no more than 1 percentage point. We then aggregate the numbers by
taking the average of the three pairwise comparisons. The results indicate that the
proportion of countries whose shares are almost equal is increasing over time for all
regions, the highest being in EMU and EU with ALADI lagging behind.
Though Proposition 1 established the equality of shares, its underlying assump-
tions can be used to explain why deviations from equality might be observed in
empirics. For example, part of the equality of shares in Eq. 3 breaks down when
the parameter space includes δρ = 0. With ρ = 0 the VES function degenerates to
Ynt = γKnt and the human capital share in Eq. 3 no longer equals the other two.
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Table 3 Fraction of countries
with equal shares Year EMU EU ALADI
1960 0.44
1965 0.50
1970 0.33
1975 0.56
1980 0.67 0.36
1985 0.67 0.42
1990 0.61 0.42
1995 0.73 0.55
2000 0.73 0.76 0.50
2005 0.72 0.79 0.58
2010 0.81 0.74 0.47
2014 0.81 0.76 0.57
2016 0.81 0.75
Notes: (i) The table reports the
average of the Y − K , Y − H
and K − H comparisons; (ii)
Shares are defined as equal if
they differ in absolute by no
more than 1 percentage point
Alternatively, human capital might be the constraining factor instead. In this case, the
physical capital share in Eq. 3 is no longer equal to the other two.
4 Steady State EquilibriumDistribution of Shares
4.1 Dynamics of Shares
We assume that changes in shares are the realization of some particular states of
nature. There are numerous reasons why shares could be random. Innovation and
discoveries of natural resources are usually believed to follow a random process once
investments in those activities have been made. Also, upheavals, military conflicts
and natural disasters hit output, stocks of human and physical capital at random. To
characterize such randomness we assume that both output and factor shares evolve
according to a reflected geometric Brownian motion (RGBM), a framework that is
widely used in theoretical and empirical studies (e.g. Gabaix 1999; Albornoz et al.
2016). The motion is characterized by a drift parameter μ, volatility σ , lower bound
b = min Sjnt and upper bound c = max Sjnt . That is, we assume:
dSjnt
Sjnt
= μdt + σdBt + dLt − dUt , (5)
where Bt is a Wiener process, while Lt and Ut denote non-negative, non-decreasing,
right-continuous processes, guaranteeing reflections every time Sjnt goes below the
lower or above the upper bound (Harrison 1985). Lower bound b is a solidarity
parameter that represents the principle of solidarity of the European Union as iden-
tified in its Charter: it is a fundamental principle based on sharing both the burdens
and the advantages like prosperity equally. The parameter prevents the economic col-
lapse of member countries below a certain threshold. The evolution of shares spelled
I. Mikolajun, J.-M. Viaene
out in Eq. 5 recognizes a link between output and primary factors in that the process
from which shocks to the shares are derived is common to all. Though the process is
similar, the realization of the states of nature might differ across shares. For exam-
ple, strikes, technical breakdowns and political upheavals disrupt the production of
goods with minor impacts on the stocks of production factors. Later in this section,
however, we discuss the case of explicitly modelled correlations. Given this we show:
Proposition 2 If shares evolve according to a reflected Brownian motion given by
Eq. 5 and its drift and volatility parameters satisfy μ < σ
2
2 , there exists a steady state
cumulative distribution of these shares that has the following form:
Fjn∞(S) = P(Sjn∞ ≤ S) = 1 − S
2μ
σ2
−1 − c 2μσ2 −1
b
2μ
σ2
−1 − c 2μσ2 −1
, S ∈ [b, c]. (6)
See the Appendix for the proof. It is clear from Eq. 6 that though realizations
of states of nature differ distributions of output and factor shares are similar when
μ = 0.
An important extension of the proposition is that the steady state distribution
exhibits power law behaviour even when shares of country i and country j and/or out-
put and factor shares are correlated. The shares must follow RGBM with a sole lower
barrier and a certain pattern of correlations described by the so called skew symme-
try condition: R diag + diag Rᵀ = 2, where  is the variance-covariance
matrix of shares, diag is a diagonal matrix whose entries are the variance of each
share and R is a reflection matrix that corrects correlations when one of the sin-
gle components hits the barrier (see Harrison and Williams 1987; Dai and Harrison
1992).
Proposition 2 is very general in that it applies to a vast class of economic environ-
ments. However, since shares are the key concepts of our analysis, we have to impose
a normalization constraint at every time to ensure summation to one:
N∑
n=1
Sjnt = 1, t = 1, ..., T . (7)
It turns out that this constraint leads to a number of simplifications:
Proposition 3 If shares evolve according to the reflected Brownian motion given by
Eq. 5 subject to the normalization constraint (7), the steady state is characterized by
μ = 0 and by the cumulative distribution of shares of the following form:
Fjn∞(S) = P(Sjn∞ ≤ S) = 1 − S
−1 − c−1
b−1 − c−1 , S ∈ [b, c] . (8)
See the Appendix for the proof. To illustrate the properties of this proposition, let
us focus on the steady state analysis of shares Snj and therefore omit the time index
t . We rank shares in a descending order attributing the highest rank to the country
having the largest share of variable of interest within the area. Then a country ranked
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the nth has the nth largest share within the area or, equivalently, n countries have their
shares larger or equal to the nth largest share. This allows to deduce the following
relationship between the cumulative distribution function and a rank:
P(Sjk ≥ Sjn) = Rjn
N
. (9)
Using the cumulative distribution function of shares (8) with c = ∞ we obtain:
P(Sjk ≥ Sjn) = 1 − P(Sjk < Sjn) =
S−1jn
b−1
. (10)
Using expressions (9) and (10) we obtain a non-linear relationship between a rank
and a share:
Sjn = λ
Rjn
, (11)
where λ = Nb.
4.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of RGBM Parameters
Having described the properties of our fully integrated group of economies through
Propositions 1 and 2, we now seek empirical support for the law of motion (5). Par-
ticularly, we follow the estimation approach outlined in Aı¨t-Sahalia (2002) and apply
Maximum Likelihood (ML) on available data for output and factor shares to estimate
the parameters μ and σ .
Let θ = (μ, σ )′ denote a vector of RGBM parameters. A critical step is the deriva-
tion of the conditional density function of normalized RGBM. No such density in its
analytical form exists in the literature. To obtain approximate estimates we use the
density of RGBM with a sole lower barrier derived in Veestraeten (2008) . In this
case the density reads:
P(Sjnt |Sjn,t−; θ) = 1
σSjnt
√
2π
exp
[
− (ln Sjnt−ln Sjn,t−−γ1)
2
2σ 2
]
+ 1
σSjnt
√
2π
exp
[
γ2
(
ln b − ln Sjn,t−
)]
exp
[
− (ln Sjnt+ln Sjn,t−−2 ln b−γ1)
2
2σ 2
]
−γ2 1Sjnt exp
[
γ2
(
ln Sjnt − ln b
)]
×
(
1 − 
[
ln Sjnt+ln Sjn,t−−2 ln b+γ1
σ
√

])
,
where
γ1 = μ − σ 22
γ2 = 2σ 2 γ1.
Sjnt denotes as before country’s n share of variable j at time point t and  is a time
step equalling 1 for annual data. ML therefore solves:
θˆ = arg max
θ
(θ) (12)
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with the log-likelihood function  being:
(θ) =
T∑
t=
N∑
n=1
ln[P(Sjnt |Sjn,t−; θ)].
Solution to Eq. 12 can be obtained by various numerical optimization algorithms
such as, for example, the algorithm of Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS).
Estimation results of model parameters μ and σ for each set of shares are pre-
sented in Table 4.3 From the table it is clear that the estimated drift parameters
are significantly non-positive as successive enlargements cause observed shares to
decline over time. Also, the volatility of output shares is generally the largest in all
three regions. This is partly due to output being a flow variable and therefore more
volatile than the more steady stocks of physical and human capital. That volatility in
EU (and even more so in EMU) is so low and decreasing can be explained by pol-
icy coordination that is a key to the region. For example, consider the scenario where
all N countries in the integrated area put in place a coordinated policy such that the
human capital of each member country increases by a factor λ (λ > 1). Then, using
Eq. 3:
Ynt
∑N
k=1 Ykt
= Knt∑N
k=1 Kkt
= λHnt∑N
k=1 λHkt
= Hnt∑N
k=1 Hkt
.
In this situation shares are not modified and the relative position of each country in
the total remains unchanged. It is clear from the above equation that complete har-
monization of policies, expressed in growth factors, makes these shares deterministic
and does not modify the distribution of shares of member countries. Hence, if one
abstracts from random shocks then the volatility of shares would be zero according
to this result. This is a useful benchmark for our empirical analysis.
Though integration in ALADI is characterized as “shallow” (WTO 2011), esti-
mates of our economic framework offer a valid representation of its data. As
expected, Spearman rank correlations of Table 2 are generally lower and estimates of
the volatility parameters in Table 4 are higher, definitely compared to the Eurozone.
As a result, we have gained confidence that the properties of the model are supported
by the data. The following sections will therefore focus on EU-28 and the Eurozone
only.4
3We tested this estimation procedure on numerous simulated RGBMs with different μ and σ to see how
estimation using normalized data affects parameter estimates. The method delivers estimates that are con-
sistent with true parameter values when simulated data is non-normalized. When simulated RGBM data is
normalized and then used as input for estimation, the method still delivers volatility (but not drift) estimate
close to its true value.
4Why is ALADI performing well? A first interpretation is that countries are becoming alike through glob-
alization. For example, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) argue that capital markets are already well integrated.
Despite large differences in capital-labor ratios, they find that marginal products of capital are close across
countries. A second interpretation is given by Felbermayr et al. (2017) where they compare countries’
external tariffs. Using 19 years of tariff data for 121 countries for more than 4000 products, they con-
clude that though institutions differ, external tariffs are quite similar. The last interpretation relates to the
notion of diversification cones, concept describing the set of all factor endowments lying on or between
sectoral capital-labour ratios. The evidence suggests a multi-cone equilibrium for the world as a whole,
implying that countries at different stages of development specialize in goods that are more suited to their
endowment (e.g., Debaere and Demiroglu 2003, Schott 2003).
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Table 4 Estimates of drift and volatility parameters
Region Variable Drift μ Volatility σ Log-likelihood
1958 - 2016
EU Output shares SY −0.015* 0.035* 4295.5
Physical capital shares SK −0.026* 0.011* 5227.8
Human capital shares SH −0.026* 0.035* 4262.9
1995 - 2016
Output shares SY −0.018* 0.025* 2869.5
Physical capital shares SK −0.020* 0.007* 6838.3
Human capital shares SH −0.037* 0.024* 2871.6
2004 - 2016
Output shares SY −0.024* 0.017* 2234.4
Physical capital shares SK −0.014* 0.006* 7627.7
Human capital shares SH −0.019* 0.005* 7093.4
1980 - 2014
ALADI Output shares SY 0.002 0.040* 2022.8
Physical capital shares SK −0.002* 0.019* 2318.5
Human capital shares SH −0.007* 0.026* 2077.3
1999 - 2014
Output shares SY −0.006* 0.033* 992.2
Physical capital shares SK −0.005* 0.015* 1147.1
Human capital shares SH −0.002* 0.016* 1087.1
1999 - 2016
EMU Output shares SY −0.026* 0.006* 2033.1
Physical capital shares SK −0.013* 0.006* 5732.6
Human capital shares SH −0.016* 0.005* 4621.5
2001 - 2016
Output shares SY −0.026* 0.006* 2145.5
Physical capital shares SK −0.012* 0.006* 5733.8
Human capital shares SH −0.014* 0.005* 4775.5
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level
5 Assessing the Degree of Economic Integration
5.1 Theoretical Shares
Assume further without loss of generality that country 1 has the largest and country
N has the smallest share of variable j in the area. That is, assume the following:
Sj1 ≥ Sj2 ≥ ... ≥ SjN , j ∈ {Y,K,H }.
Given the above information, we derive the shares that describe the steady state
equilibrium of an integrated area:
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Proposition 4 The steady state distribution of shares is uniquely determined by the
number of countries N . Particularly, shares are the solution to the following set of
equations
Sj1
Sj2
= 2, Sj1
Sj3
= 3, ..., Sj1
SjN
= N . (13)
and
Sj1 = 1∑N
n=1 n−1
(14)
See the proof in the Appendix. The steady-state distribution of shares among
integrated economies obtained in Proposition 4 has a number of implications. It
reproduces the main outcome of neo-classical growth theory in that the steady
state capital-labor ratios are equal among countries that share the same technology.
Besides this well-known result, the main contribution of Proposition 4 is to show
that for integrated economies the distribution of shares is uniquely determined once
the number of member countries is known, a feature shared by all RTAs since the
number of member countries is always finite. For example, Table 5 applies the propo-
sition to the EU and gives the complete distribution of shares for the successive EU
enlargements. Assuming μ = 0 implies Zipf’s law: the share of the first ranked coun-
try is twice as large as the share of the second ranked country, three times as large
as the share of the third country and so on. Lastly, it is worth noting that as long as
the drift parameter μ is zero, the steady state distribution is unaffected by volatil-
ity. This allows for heterogeneity of volatility parameters across variables and across
countries. We denote the steady state distribution as S¯.
5.2 Measurement of Integration
Given the theory and the empirical analysis thus far we are in a position to verify
a first conjecture, namely that the integration pattern achieved by EU institutions is
unsatisfactory. To that end, we measure the degree of economic integration by an
integration index IE(S¯, St ) which is a transformed Euclidean distance. It is defined
as
IE(S¯, St ) = e−E(S¯,St ), (15)
where E(S¯, St ) is the Euclidean distance, measuring the deviation of observed shares
Sjnt from their theoretical counterparts S¯jn found by applying Proposition 4:
E(S¯, St ) = 1
3
∑
j=Y,K,H
√
√
√
√
N∑
n=1
(S¯jn − Sjnt )2. (16)
The Euclidean distance (16) has the properties of a metric. For example, it is always
non-negative and takes the value zero when for each variable j and for each n ranked
country, Sjnt = S¯jn : this is the property that arises under full integration. The lower
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Table 5 Steady state distribution of shares for the European Union (μ = 0)
Rank N = 6 N = 9 N = 10 N = 12 N = 15 N = 25 N = 27 N = 28
1 0.4082 0.3535 0.3414 0.3222 0.3014 0.2621 0.2570 0.2546
2 0.2041 0.1767 0.1707 0.1611 0.1507 0.1310 0.1285 0.1273
3 0.1361 0.1178 0.1138 0.1074 0.1005 0.0874 0.0857 0.0849
4 0.1020 0.0884 0.0854 0.0806 0.0753 0.0655 0.0642 0.0637
5 0.0816 0.0707 0.0683 0.0644 0.0603 0.0524 0.0514 0.0509
6 0.0680 0.0589 0.0569 0.0537 0.0502 0.0437 0.0428 0.0424
7 0.0505 0.0488 0.0460 0.0431 0.0374 0.0367 0.0364
8 0.0442 0.0427 0.0403 0.0377 0.0328 0.0321 0.0318
9 0.0393 0.0379 0.0358 0.0335 0.0291 0.0286 0.0283
10 0.0341 0.0322 0.0301 0.0262 0.0257 0.0255
11 0.0293 0.0274 0.0238 0.0234 0.0231
12 0.0269 0.0251 0.0218 0.0214 0.0212
13 0.0232 0.0202 0.0198 0.0196
14 0.0215 0.0187 0.0184 0.0182
15 0.0201 0.0175 0.0171 0.0170
16 0.0164 0.0161 0.0159
17 0.0154 0.0151 0.0150
18 0.0146 0.0143 0.0141
19 0.0138 0.0135 0.0134
20 0.0131 0.0128 0.0127
21 0.0125 0.0122 0.0121
22 0.0119 0.0117 0.0116
23 0.0114 0.0112 0.0111
24 0.0109 0.0107 0.0106
25 0.0105 0.0103 0.0102
26 0.0099 0.0098
27 0.0095 0.0094
28 0.0091
is the degree of economic integration the greater is the deviation of the measure from
zero, the lower is the value of IE(S¯, St ).5
Computation of IE(S¯, St ) makes use of the following information: (1) We use
the results of Proposition 4 to compute theoretical shares for the varying number
5To test robustness of our findings to different measures of distance between observed and the-
oretical shares we also compute the Theil entropy index. The index is given by T (S¯, St ) =
1
3
∑
j=Y,K,H
(∑N
n=1 S¯jn ln
(
S¯jn
Sjnt
))
and respectively the integration measure IT (S¯, St ) = e−T (S¯,St ). Like
Euclidean integration index the Theil index takes the maximum value of unity when observed shares coin-
cide with their theoretical counterparts and there exists a positive minimum value due to share summation
to one. The results using this index lead to the same conclusions as the results of integration index IE .
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Fig. 4 Integration measure IE for the EU with estimated confidence bounds. Note: Shaded area denotes
a 95% confidence interval obtained by taking 10000 bootstrap samples with replacement. See also
Appendix C
of countries that became member of the European Union. These values are found
in Table 5; (2) Observed shares are ranked in the descending order so that rank 1
(n = 1) is attributed to the country with the largest share in the area; rank 2 (n = 2)
to the second largest share, etc. Each enlargement requires the re-computation of
output and factor shares based on new data; (3) At any date and for each set of
countries, confidence bounds are constructed using 10000 bootstrap samples with
replacement.6
Figure 4 displays the computed index values. The results suggest that most of the
time the degree of economic integration fluctuates around 0.9. The time pattern is
non-linear indicating that the different enlargements have a differentiated impact on
EU integration and that the latter is also responsive to world economic conditions.
The values of the index are however, all significantly lower than unity at the 5% sig-
nificance level suggesting that although high, integration is incomplete. What follows
will not change these conclusions.
6Due to share summation to one in Eq. 7 there exists a strictly positive lower bound of the integration
measure. We estimate this value to be equal to 0.55. This estimate is the minimum value of Eq. 15 obtained
by taking 10000 bootstrap samples with replacement from the data on an extended set of regions. The
integration index therefore takes values within the (0.55, 1] interval, with 1 arising under full integration.
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5.3 Additional Results
5.3.1 Revision of Integration Measure
Spearman rank correlations of Table 2 indicate that the conformity of ranks is not
perfect, i.e. the equal-share relationship that should hold in our fully integrated bench-
mark does not always hold in the data. Our index (15) does not take that into account
so far; specifically we miss to assure that the country that ranks nth in the output
distribution of shares is also nth in the distribution of primary factors. It is therefore
important to re-compute index (15) so that this distortion is accounted for.
For example, let us consider the UK in 2016. Figure 1 reveals that it is ranked sec-
ond in EU-28 for output (Y ) and human capital (H ) but fourth for its share of physical
capital (K): the equal-share relationship is clearly violated in this case and penal-
ties for such violations must be introduced in Eq. 15. Our correction is as follows.
To preserve the equality of shares between H , K and Y , UK physical capital share
(K) is positioned second though it is not, which introduces larger gaps between S¯Kn
and SKn,2016 (see Table 6). Hence, this correction increases E(S¯, St ) and decreases
the integration measure. The more a country violates the equal-share relationship
the larger are the deviations and the smaller is the value of the integration index.7
Let IR(S¯, St ) denote the revised measure. Figure 5 contains information regarding
the extent of the revision for EU and EMU. Panel (a) shows the index values com-
puted using Eq. 15; panel (b) shows revised integration index values. As it is clear,
revised index values are slightly lower than the original ones. However, the decline
in the integration measure is not very large. This is because of the relatively high
correlations between different pairs of shares. The results suggest that the extent of
economic integration is higher in the Eurozone and clearly more stable.
5.3.2 Assessing Trends in EU Integration
The integration performance of the EU and the sequence of enlargements experi-
enced since the 1957 Treaty of Rome raise the following important issue: What is the
time pattern of EU integration: increasing or decreasing? The answer to this ques-
tion uses segmented regression in which the integration index IR(S¯, St ) is partitioned
into intervals whose boundaries are integration breakpoints. The estimation tech-
nique thus endogenously detects over which period the integration variable stagnates,
shows a positive or negative trend (Muggeo 2003).8
Initially we enter seven enlargement dates as potential breakpoints to the analysis
and let the algorithm determine how many of them are actual breakpoints. Except for
1957, none of enlargement dates are selected as containing breakpoints, though some
are close. Figure 6 shows the optimization results that display a distorted w-shape.
7The revision of the integration index could be performed using observed ranking of human and physical
capital shares instead but results are quite similar.
8The problem is to find the least squares estimates of a regression function whose first derivatives are
discontinuous. The existence of kinks in the dependent variable is solved by an iterative fitting of linear
models.
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Fig. 5 Integration in the EU and Eurozone: a comparison. Note: Revision of the index is performed using
observed ranking of output shares
After more than 60 years of the Rome Treaty and 25 years of the Maastricht Treaty,
the time profile of European integration is rather unknown and our analysis tries
to fill this gap. The difficulty arises from the lack of specification of the limits to
integration. When the latter are not defined, episodes of European integration are
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Fig. 6 Integration measure IR for the EU with the estimated non-linear trend
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compared to the USA as analysts and policymakers often refer explicitly or implicitly
to the union of US states as the benchmark of complete integration. For example,
Bowen et al. (2011) reveal that by 2000 the measured extent of integration of EU
countries was essentially the same as that of the US states. Rogers (2007) provides
evidence of a striking decline in dispersion for traded goods prices in Europe over
the period 1990-2004. By 2004 dispersion in the euro area is quite close to that of the
USA. On the whole, the patterns of Figs. 5b and 6 support this empirical evidence.
Specifically, the membership of the UK, Ireland and Denmark has initiated a very
long period of integration growth (likewise for Greece, Spain and Portugal). EU inte-
gration peaked in the period 1995 - 2000 but collapsed afterwards following drastic
events like the dot-com bubble, September 11th attacks, stock market downturns of
2002 and the second Persian Gulf War. The opening of EU to Eastern countries in
2004 and 2007 also contributed positively to EU integration. However, since 2011,
integration in the EU-28 has stalled. This is clear from the regression slope estimates
of Table 7 where the slope of the last segment is not significantly different from zero.
6 Brexit
The first part of this section explores the quantitative implications of Brexit using
the comparative statics results of our theory. This is followed by a direct application
of our framework by computing the effect of the UK departure from the European
Union on integration levels.
6.1 Labour Exodus
Consider for a moment the relative position of the UK within the European Union
by looking at outflows of UK productive factors that are likely to occur in the transi-
tion to the official Brexit date. The focus is on human capital though physical capital
can be coped with by analogy. The reason for this emphasis is the planned relo-
cation on the continent of European agencies like the European Medicines Agency
(EMA) and European Banking Authority (EBA) currently located in London. Simul-
taneously, multinationals and international banks are taking similar steps to relocate
some affiliates elsewhere within EU-27.
Table 7 Breakpoints and slope estimates of the segmented regression
Breakpoint Slope Standard error Lower 95% confidence bound Upper 95% confidence bound
1957 −0.0007 0.0002 −0.0009 −0.0005
1977 0.0031 0.0008 0.0014 0.0047
1981 0.0013 0.0001 0.0011 0.0016
1999 −0.0077 0.0018 −0.0114 −0.0040
2002 0.0010 0.0003 0.0004 0.0017
2011 0.0002 0.0006 −0.0011 0.0014
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Let the nth economic unit be the UK. Consider an exogenous outflow H > 0
of human capital out of the nth economic unit that relocates in the rest of the region.
This outflow, at impact, will affect relationship (3) for the nth country as follows:
Yn
∑N
k=1 Yk
= Kn∑N
k=1 Kk
>
Hn − H
∑N
k=1 Hk + (H − H)
This outflow of labour out of the UK decreases its share of the total stock of human
capital. Since this drop in human capital decreases country UK’s marginal return to
physical capital, incentives arise to decrease investment in physical capital. Given
the decrease in both stocks of productive factors, country n’s output and share in
total area output will decrease. These adjustments in both output and factor stocks
continue until the equality of shares in Eq. 3 is restored, but now with UK achieving
a relatively lower level of economic activity than originally.
6.2 IntegrationMeasures
The computation of the new integration index in Eq. 15 is performed by repeating
steps of previous sections: (1) With Brexit, firms in EU-27 maximize profits in a new
environment with no international labor mobility with the UK, with a wedge between
EU and UK prices resulting from tariff and non-tariff barriers and no solidarity via
Regional and Social Funds; (2) The new steady state of EU-27 is computed using
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Fig. 7 Integration measure in EU and EU excl. UK. Note: Revised measure of integration IR is used in
the figure
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Proposition 4; (3) Observed shares are re-computed for this new set of EU-27 coun-
tries; (4) These are ranked in descending order so that rank 1 (n = 1) is attributed
to the country with the largest share in the new area; rank 2 (n = 2) to the second
largest share; etc. Figure 7 displays the computed index values for both scenarios,
EU-28 and EU-27 (excl. UK).
From Fig. 7 it is clear that the extent of economic integration measured by the
integration index is higher in the EU-27 (excl. UK) scenario. This is because the
distribution of productive resources across countries in the new situation comes closer
to the ideal distribution obtained in an integrated area with free trade and free factor
mobility. Technically, with the United Kingdom being comparable in size to some
other EU economies like France or Italy, the EU-27 scenario would bring the actual
distribution of shares closer to its steady state values. This suggests the absence of
negative consequences of Brexit on EU’s integration.
7 Concluding Remarks
In response to the perception that Brexit involves a process of economic dis-
integration, the paper developed a theoretical framework that enables the measure-
ment of economic integration among a group of countries. The objective was to
construct an integration benchmark that consists of a steady state equilibrium distri-
bution of economic activity that was characterized by arbitrage pricing and perfect
factor mobility. The model predictions were then tested with respect to the members
of EU and for two other control groups, the Eurozone and Latin America (ALADI).
In all cases, the empirical results strongly supported the theoretical predictions. Given
this, metrics were then used to measure the distance between the benchmark and the
data.
Measurement allowed for a comparison of integration indices over time and across
regions. It was performed on the various enlargements of the European Union and
Eurozone, regions characterized by different institutional arrangements. The results
suggest that the extent of economic integration is clearly the highest in the Eurozone
but values are all very close to each other.
In response to the title of the paper, the results of our framework inferred the quan-
titative implications of Brexit. It turns out that the UK departure from the European
Union has no negative consequence on integration levels of EU excl. UK.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Results
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Marginal products of human capital implied by Eq. 2 can be expressed as a function
f of human-to-physical capital (x) and as a function g of output-to-physical capital
(y). In particular, at any date t:
∂Yn
∂Hn
= f
(
Hn
Kn
)
= g
(
Yn
Kn
)
,
where
f (x) = γ δρ (x + ρ − 1)δρ−1
and
g (y) = γ 1δρ δρy1− 1δρ .
Functions f and g are strictly decreasing. In particular,
∂f
∂x
= γ δρ (δρ − 1) (x + ρ − 1)δρ−2 < 0
as the first two terms of the product have opposite signs while the last term is always
positive. Namely, γ δρ > 0 and δρ − 1 < 0, which follows directly from the domain
over which parameters γ , δ, ρ are defined, and
x + ρ − 1 > 1 − ρ
1 − δρ δρ > 0,
which follows from the fact that x > 0 and x > 1−ρ1−δρ . Similarly,
∂g
∂y
= γ 1δρ δρ
(
1 − 1
δρ
)
y
− 1
δρ < 0,
which follows again from the definition of the domain of parameters γ , δ, ρ.
Perfect mobility of labour brings about the equalization of value marginal prod-
ucts of human capital across member countries as human capital from the low-return
country flows to the high-return country until efficiency wages fully equalize. With
free trade the price of the single good are similar across countries. Given this and
the strict monotonicity of f and g, equality of marginal products implies equality of
human-to-physical capital ratios and output-to-capital ratios between any two mem-
bers of the economic area. Namely, for any pair of countries j and n we obtain the
following equality:
Hn
Kn
= Hj
Kj
and
Yn
Kn
= Yj
Kj
, (A.17)
which is sufficient to conclude that for any country n within a fully integrated eco-
nomic area the human capital share coincides with that of physical capital and the
physical capital share coincides with that of output. Specifically, employing (A.17)
gives:
Hn
∑N
k=1 Hk
= 1∑N
k=1
Hk
Hn
= 1∑N
k=1
Kk
Kn
= Kn∑N
k=1 Kk
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and
Kn
∑N
k=1 Kk
= 1∑N
k=1
Kk
Kn
= 1∑N
k=1
Yk
Yn
= Yn∑N
k=1 Yk
,
from where the equal-share relationship (3) follows.
A.2 Derivation of Eq. 4
Using elements of the proof of Proposition 1, we know for region n:
∂Yn
∂Hn
= f (xn) = g(yn)
where xn = HnKn and yn = YnKn . From (1), expressions f (·) and g(·) for region n are:
f (xn) = γ δρ(xn + ρ − 1)(δρ−1)
and
g(yn) = γ 1/δρ δρy(δρ−1)/δρn .
Likewise for any region j :
f (xj ) = γ δρ(xj + ρ − 1)(δρ−1)
and
g(yj ) = γ 1/δρ δρy(δρ−1)/δρj .
First order conditions imply equal value marginal products of physical capital across
regions:
Sn1p1g(y1) = ... = Snjpjg(yj ) = ... = Snnpng(yn) = ... = SnNpNg(yN),
where Snj is the nominal bilateral exchange rate expressed as units of n currency per
unit of j currency (so that Snn = 1). Isolating regions j and n:
.... = pnγ 1/δρ δρy(δρ−1)/δρn = Snjpjγ 1/δρ δρy(δρ−1)/δρj = ...
Let us scale all prices with respect to good n and define Qnj = Snjpj /pn as the real
bilateral exchange rate (so that Qnj = 1 with n = j ). Taking the power δρ/(δρ − 1)
common to all countries:
... = yn = Qδρ/(δρ−1)j yj = ...
or
... = Yn
Kn
= Q

j Yj
Kj
= ...
where  = δρ/(δρ − 1). Altogether:
... = Yn
Kn
= Q

j Yj
Kj
= ... =
∑N
k=1 Qk Yk
∑N
k=1 Kk
For region n, a transformation of this equality gives the following relationships
between ratios of output and physical capital:
Kn
∑N
k=1 Kk
= Yn∑N
k=1 Qk Yk
(A.18)
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The equality of rates of return to human capital across the N members can be written:
Sn1p1f (x1) = ... = Snjpjf (xj ) = ... = Snnpnf (xn) = ... = SnNpNf (xN)
Focusing on j and n:
... = Snnpnγ δρ(xn + ρ − 1)(δρ−1) = Snjpjγ δρ(xj + ρ − 1)(δρ−1) = ...
In compliance with Anderson et al. (2015) we assume a Cobb Douglas production
function (ρ = 1):
... = Snnpnx(δρ−1)n = Snjpjx(δρ−1)j = ...
Like before, let us scale all prices with respect to good n and use Qnj = Snjpj/pn
with Qnn = Snnpn/pn = 1. Taking the power 1/(δρ − 1) common to all countries:
... = xn = Q1/(δρ−1)nj xj = ...
or
... = Hn
Kn
= Q

njHj
Kj
= ...
where  = 1/(δρ − 1). Altogether:
... = Hn
Kn
= Q

njHj
Kj
= ... =
∑N
k=1 QnkHk
∑N
k=1 Kk
.
For region n, a transformation of this equality gives the following relationships
between ratios of human and physical capital:
Kn
∑N
k=1 Kk
= Hn∑N
k=1 QnkHk
. (A.19)
Combining (A.18) and (A.19):
Yn
∑N
k=1 QnkYk
= Kn∑N
k=1 Kk
= Hn∑N
k=1 QnkHk
. (A.20)
Thus, the introduction of a model with differentiation by place of origin though it
rescales variables (Yn,Hn) by relative prices maintain the equal-share relationship.
Now assume purchasing power parity, that is Snj = pn/pj and Qnj = 1 as the real
bilateral exchange rate becomes unity. Then:
Yn
∑N
k=1 Yk
= Kn∑N
k=1 Kk
= Hn∑N
k=1 Hk
(A.21)
That reproduces expression (3) of Proposition 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Itoˆ lemma applied to log Sjnt yields the following expression for Eq. 5 for any initial
value Sjn0 : {
log Sjnt = Xnt + Lt − Ut
Xnt = log Sjn0 +
(
μ − σ 22
)
t + σBt (A.22)
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A convenient way to model reflections is to use Skorokhod maps that restrict shares
to take values within a given interval. In particular, Lt and Ut are defined as
{
Lt = − inf0≤s≤t ({Xns − log b} ∧ {0})
Ut = − inf0≤s≤t ({log c − Xns} ∧ {0})
where inf stands for the infimum of a set so that reflections occur now at log b and
log c. For μ and σ such that μ < σ
2
2 there exists a steady state distribution of
Eq. A.22. Zhang and Du (2010) derive the steady state density function of RGBM
with two barriers. The function reads:
fjn∞(S) =
(
1 − 2μ
σ 2
)
S
2μ
σ2
−2
b
2μ
σ2
−1 − c 2μσ2 −1
.
The corresponding cumulative distribution is then given by Eq. 6.9
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
μ = 0 follows from the adding-up constraint (7). Let gjnt = SjntSjn,t−1 − 1
denote the growth rate of factor j , country n at time point t . Then Eq. 7
implies
∑N
n=1 Sjn,t−1gjnt = 0. Taking average of this expression over time gives
Et
∑N
n=1 Sjn,t−1gjnt =
∑N
n=1 Sjn,t−1Etgjnt = 0 and because in our model the drift
parameter μ does not vary across countries, this holds only if Etgjnt = 0. Therefore,
the average growth rate must be zero.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Using (11) and taking the ratio of the first share over the second share, the first share
over the third, etc. gives the sequence of ratios (13) in the proposition:
Sj1
Sj2
= λ/Rj1
λ/Rj2
= Rj2
Rj1
=2, Sj1
Sj3
= λ/Rj1
λ/Rj3
= Rj3
Rj1
=3, ..., Sj1
SjN
= λ/Rj1
λ/RjN
= RjN
Rj1
=N .
The definition of shares implies also that the same rule holds not only for shares but
also for the levels of the variables j ∈ {Y,K,H }. Without loss of generality assume
j = H :
H1
H2
= 2, H1
H3
= 3, ..., H1
HN
= N .
This in turn together with the definition of shares uniquely determines the share of
the first ranked country or the largest share as a function of the number of countries
only. Namely:
SH1 = H1∑N
n=1 Hn
= 1∑N
n=1
Hn
H1
= 1∑N
n=1 n−1
9When c = ∞ it is a Pareto distribution with the tail index equalling
(
1 − 2μ
σ 2
)
. The tail index can take
any positive value. The adding-up constraint (7) that we impose further will prevent shares from being
infinite in expectation in case the tail index is smaller than 1.
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Fig. 8 Human capital data interpolation. The example of Lithuania and the Netherlands
that is (14). Shares of other countries can be determined similarly. Likewise for j =
K,Y .
Appendix B: Data Sources andMethods
B.1 Human Capital
For the three groups of countries (ALADI, EU and Eurozone), human capital is
measured as total population aged 15 and over with at least completed secondary
education10 and is obtained from Barro and Lee’s data set on educational attainment
(version 2.1). The data is on the 5-year interval basis covering the period 1950 - 2010
and is available for all the countries under analysis. We use cubic spline interpola-
tion to obtain annual data. The method is illustrated in Fig. 8 with points representing
original figures before interpolation.
To extend interpolation until 2016 we need human capital data for 2015 and 2020.
The data for 2015 and 2020 is obtained from Barro and Lee’s projections of edu-
cational attainment for the population aged 15–64. We compute the percentage of
population aged 15–64 with at least completed secondary education and use it as a
proxy for the percentage of population aged 15+ with at least completed secondary
education. We then multiply it by the population aged 15+ in 2015 and 2020 to
obtain human capital in those years. Population aged 15+ is obtained from the World
Bank population projections. We download 2010, 2015 and 2020 data points, com-
pute growth rates and apply them to extend Barro and Lee data on population aged
15 and over.
10We consider the sum of the population aged 15 and over with (i) completed secondary education as
the highest obtained education level and (ii) completed or incomplete tertiary education as the highest
obtained education level.
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B.2 Physical Capital
Data for physical capital in all regions come from Penn World Tables, version 6.2
(PWT 6.2) and cover the period of 1950–2004. The data is in constant prices with the
base year of 2000. Measurement units are international dollars.
There were two problems associated with the capital stock data in hand. First, the
data was available until the year 2004 only or even until 2003 for some of the coun-
tries. Second, no data was available for Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
To solve the first above mentioned problem we applied the growth rates of PWT
9.0 physical capital stock data (variable rkna). This extended the data till 2014. To
extend it further till 2016 we used the growth rates of physical capital stock from
European Commission’s AMECO database (variable oknd).
To solve the second problem we relied on PWT 9.0 data for the year 2011. In that
year we computed the ratio of physical capital for missing countries to Dutch physical
capital and multiplied it by 2011 Dutch physical capital from PWT 6.2. Thus, for
example, Lithuanian physical capital in 2011 was obtained as:
KLT,2011 =
KPWT 9.0LT,2011
KPWT 9.0NL,2011
KPWT 6.2NL,2011.
To extend the series backwards and forwards we used the growth rates of physical
capital from PWT 9.0 (variable rkna) and AMECO.
B.3 Output
Output in all country groupings, measured by real GDP, is obtained from PWT 7.0.
The data ranges from 1950 to 2009 and is expressed in international dollars to equal-
ize the purchasing power of different currencies and allow for cross-country level
data comparison. PWT 7.0 uses the year 2005 as a base year for all constant price
variables. We use 2000 as the base year in our study. Hence, to convert the base year
of real output to 2000 we find the implicit deflator in 2000 for each of the countries
and rescale 2005 constant price series accordingly. To extend the series till 2014 we
use the growth rates of real GDP from PWT 9.0 (variable rgdpna). We also use the
growth rates from the same source to extend German GDP backwards till 1950. To
extend Cuban data till 2015 we apply the growth rates of GDP in constant 2011 USD
obtained from the World Bank WDI database. Finally, we use Eurostat real GDP
growth rates to compute 2015 - 2016 data for the EU countries (code: tec00115).
Appendix C: Bootstrap Samples
We construct the confidence interval for the integration measure using the bootstrap
technique. To implement the bootstrap we draw random samples with replace-
ment from the data on output and production factors. For illustration purposes let
us consider the EU-6 in 1958. We have three sets of variables {Y1, Y2, ..., Y6},
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{K1,K2, ...,K6} and {H1, H2, ..., H6}. We draw 10000 random samples from each of
the sets. Our samples are of the same size as the data and the possibility of replace-
ment means that a variable of a particular country can be selected more than once.
An example of a sample for output could therefore be {Y2, Y2, Y4, Y4, Y4, Y1}. Once
10000 samples are drawn, for each of the samples we compute output and produc-
tion factor shares and rank them in descending order. Further, we generate theoretical
shares given in Table 5. This allows us to compute 10000 integration indices. To
find the 95% confidence interval we rank computed integration indices and take the
lower 2.5% and the upper 97.5% data points. The 2.5% and the 97.5% points define
our confidence interval. We compute confidence intervals for the Spearman rank
correlations in Table 2 in a similar manner.
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